1977年巴菲特致股东信

"投资哲学"

Posted by Yongxian on November 20, 2017

1977年伯克希尔哈撒韦营业收入为2190.04万美元,即每股22.54美元,比一年前的预期略好。纺织业务收入低于预期,但是伊利诺伊州银行和保险业收入远超预期。 在1977年,初始权益资本的营业利润率达到了19%,比去年稍好一点,高于我们自己的长期平均水平和美国工业总体水平。每股经营收益比上年增长了37%,初始资本增长了24%。

纺织业

77年纺织业状况不好,未达到预期收入,有我们预测能力的问题,也有纺织业本身的问题。少数股东对持有纺织业是否明智有疑问,长期来看,纺织企业不能产生其他业务的回报。我们的纺织业在当地是最大的雇佣企业,很多高龄工人没有其他技能,而且工人和工会积极配合管理层进行产品结构调整和成本管理。65年后在Ken Chace’s的领导下,纺织业为保险业扩张、收购提供大量资金,艰苦努力和高效配置,能够实现一定利润。

保险业务

保险业务在1977年继续明显的增长。在1967年初,我们大约花费860万美元收购National Indemnity Company 和 National Fire and Marine Insurance Company进入这个行业,那一年它们的保费达到2200万美元。在1977年我们保费合计1.51亿美元。 总的来说,保险业务已经非常成功。但它不是一条单行道。在这十年中在产品和人员犯了一些重大错误。但是在顺风行业比逆风行业有更大投资价值。

保险投资

在过去两年保险投资成本(不包括对附属公司蓝筹邮票的投资)已经从1.346亿美元增长到2.528亿美元。除了这些来自股息和利息的收入之外,还实现了税前690万美元的资本收益。

银行业

伊利诺伊州国家银行的资产收益率持续大约是大多数大银行的三倍。这个记录是在银行向储户支付最高利率并保持资产状况结合低风险和卓越的流动性的情况下实现的。 。

蓝筹印花公司

增加了蓝筹的股权,并在1977年底拥有约36.5%股份,蓝筹今年有好的一年,收入约1290万美元业务,此外,已经实现证券收益410万美元。

投资哲学

1.In a sense, this is the opposite case from our textile business where even very good management probably can average only modest results. One of the lessons your management has learned - and, unfortunately, sometimes re-learned - is the importance of being in businesses where tailwinds prevail rather than headwinds.

从某种意义上说,纺织是企业相反的情况,即使是非常好的管理,也只能取得微薄的成果。您的管理层所学到的一个教训 - 不幸的是,有时重新学习 在顺风而不是逆风而行的企业中的重要性。

We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price. We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short term. In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price.

2.选择投资企业的基础条件:

  • 投资我们能理解的企业
  • 所投资企业具有良好的前景
  • 这些企业由诚实、能干的人管理
  • 非常具有吸引力的价格

我们不会因为短期价格变化而购买资产,如果公司业绩不断令我们满意,我们愿意用更好的价格获得好的企业。

When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with the expectation that excellent business results by corporations will translate over the long term into correspondingly excellent market value and dividend results for owners, minority as well as majority.

3.当价格合适的时候,我们愿意在选定的公司中担任很大的职位,而不是有任何控制意图,也不是预测出售或合并,而是期望公司出色的经营业绩能够长期转化为相对优秀的市场价值和分红业绩,对拥有者、少数以及多数股东。

While control would give us the opportunity - and the responsibility - to manage operations and corporate resources, we would not be able to provide management in either of those respects equal to that now in place. In effect, we can obtain a better management result through non-control than control. This is an unorthodox view, but one we believe to be sound.

4.尽管控制权给我们管理运营和公司资源的机会和责任,但是我们无法提供与现在相同的管理。实际上,通过非控制而不是控制,我们可以获得更好的管理效果。这是一个非正统的观点,但我们认为是一个健全的观点。

Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company.

5.我们大部分大型股票仓位将持续多年,而我们投资决策的计分卡将由该期间的业绩提供,而不是任何一天的价格。正如在收购整个公司时过分关注短期前景是愚蠢的,我们认为,在购买小公司时,可能会被潜在的近期收益或最近的收益趋势迷住。

Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial economic performance to be return on equity capital.

6.除特殊情况(如具有不寻常的债务比例或重要资产在不切实际的资产负债表价值的公司),我们认为更适当的管理经济绩效衡量标准是股本回报。

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